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and no human institution is totally

perfect. In some areas, the Federal Circuit has had to "feel its
way" toward a definitive statement of the law. Examples are
inequitable conduct and the doctrine of equivalents in the field
of patents ....

Such case-by-case development of the law is

normal and will doubtless continue. An occasional misstep may

require correction . . . but the Federal Circuit's established

procedures have kept such aberrations to an absolute minimum.'
-

Former Chief Judge Howard T. Markey

I.

INTRODUCTION

Since its inception in 1982,2 the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit ("Federal Circuit") has brought a new level of certainty to
patent litigation and patent prosecution. Before the creation of the
Federal Circuit, the federal appellate courts were split on thirteen
separate fundamental issues involving the field of patent law. 3 After
being granted special and sole jurisdiction over appeals involving
patent litigation and prosecution, the Federal Circuit resolved all of
these conflicts within the first three years of its existence. 4
However, the Federal Circuit has not brought absolute certainty
to the field of patent law. At the boundary of what is ascertainable
from the opinions of the court lies a concept at the heart of many
patent infringement cases, the doctrine of equivalents. A troublesome
area for judge and practitioner alike, a uniform doctrine of equivalents
has remained elusive, despite the valiant attempts of the Federal
Circuit, both as panels and en banc.3
In all fairness to former Chief Judge Markey, the "occasional
missteps" in this area of patent law have not been "aberrations."
1. Howard T. Markey, The Federal Circuit and Congressional Intent, 41 AM.
U. L. REv. 577, 579 (1992) (Former Chief Judge, Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 1982-92).
2. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created by the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. For a full discussion
of the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, see infra notes 13-23
and accompanying text.
3. Markey, supra note 1, at 577.
4. See id.
5. En banc, or in banc, "refers to a session where the entire membership of the
court will participate in the decision rather than the regular quorum." BLACK's LAW
DIcTIoNARY 526-27 (6th ed. 1990). An en banc hearing ordinarily will only be ordered
when "consideration by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of
its decisions" or "the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance." FED.
R. App. P. 35(a).
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With every succeeding opinion, the Federal Circuit's attempts to
reduce the doctrine to a uniform statement have resulted in increased
confusion for the practitioner. The court has not only succeeded in
complicating the procedure and substance involved in application of
the doctrine, but, as a result of their pursuit of a uniform rule, the
court has altered allied doctrines in an unnecessary manner.
The doctrine of equivalents was created as an equitable doctrine
to assist the patentee at a time when the patent was structured much
differently than it is today. Times have changed, and the Patent Act
has developed and matured. While the changes in patent structure
and prosecution procedure do not rule out further application of the
doctrine of equivalents, they suggest a new approach to the application
of the doctrine should be taken to end the ceaseless complication of
the doctrine in the pursuit of a more certain application at trial.
This article outlines the conflicts involved in the Federal Circuit's
attempts to create certainty in the doctrine of equivalents and proposes
a new role for the doctrine to allow it to return to a simpler state.
Section II outlines and details the conflict between the theoretical
positions of the Federal Circuit and the doctrine of equivalents.
Section III explores the conflict as illustrated in two of the Federal
Circuit's doctrine of equivalents opinions: Pennwalt Corp. v. DurandWayland, Inc. 6 and Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey
and Associates.7 Section IV outlines the complications these opinions
have created in the areas of patent litigation and practice. In response,
sections V and VI present a new focus for the doctrine, utilizing some
of the legislative solutions already in existence in the Patent Act to
allow the doctrine to return to the original analysis envisioned for the
in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co.
doctrine by the Supreme Court
8
v. Linde Air Products Co.
THE THEORETICAL CONFLICT WITHIN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
OVER THE CORRECT APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

II.

At the heart the confusion surrounding the doctrine of equivalents is a theoretical divergence between the goals protected under
the doctrine of equivalents and those protected by the Federal
Circuit. Patent law is itself based on a tension between two competing interests. First, the patent has value to the inventor as a
guarantee of protection, an exclusive right granted by the
6. 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
7. 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
8. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
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government 9 to stimulate inventors to add to the sum of human
9. The Constitution authorizes Congress "[tlo promote the Progress of ...
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to ...Inventors the exclusive Right to their
...Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl.
8. This exclusive right of inventors to
their "Discoveries" is protected under the Patent Act of 1952, administered by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office ("Patent Office") as Title 35 of the United
States Code. The patent grant gives the inventor an exclusive right to his device for a
period of seventeen years from the date of issuance. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
Although some authors term the patent grant a "monopoly," see 1 PETER D.
ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1991); Martin Adelman,
The Doctrine of Equivalents in PatentLaw.: Questions That Pennwalt DidNot Answer,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 674 (1989) [hereinafter Adelman, Doctrine], this use of
terminology is unfortunate, because of the antitrust meaning commonly associated with
"monopoly."
A monopoly is generally considered to be a negative use of available social
resources; a monopoly "takes something from the people." United States v. Dubilier
Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 11 178, 186 (1933). However, the patent grant does not
deprive the public of something already in the public domain. ROBERT L. HARMON,
PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 1.3, at 10 (2d ed. 1991); 1 ROSENBERG, supra, §
1.03, at 1-9 to 1-10. Rather, the inventor "gives something of value to the community
by adding to the sum of human knowledge." Dubilier Condenser, 289 U.S. at 186.
Therefore, even at this fundamental level, the patent "monopoly" can be seen to be
different from the normal, socially unacceptable, meaning of the word. 1 ROSENBERG,
supra, § 1.03, at 1-9 to 1-10.
Furthermore, the patent grant does not guarantee the patentee "market power."
Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 875 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting USM
Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1107 (1983)). A true monopoly, using the antitrust sense of the word, requires
"monopoly power" (or "market power"), the "economic control over price and
production." WILLIAM C.

HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW §

1.02, at 1-3 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1991); see id. § 6.02[2], at 6-9. As "competing products
are readily available," the patent holder will generally lack control over the price and
production of the patented invention. HOLMES, supra, § 1.02, at 1-3; see also Nickola
v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898, 914 n.25 (6th Cir. 1978) (Markey, J.) ("A patented product
rarely enjoys a dominant share in the relevant market. .

.

. 'Of course it is common

knowledge that a patent does not always confer a monopoly over a particular
commodity. Often the patent is limited to a unique form or improvement of the
product and the economic power resulting from the patent privileges is slight."'); 1
IRVING KAYTON, PATENT PRACTICE 1-32 to 1-33 (4th ed. 1989). Contra 1 ROSENBERG,
supra, § 1.03, at 1-9. Rather the patentee is given the exclusive right to exclude others
from using the patented device, 35 U.S.C § 154 (1988), which is the essence of property.
Nickola, 580 F.2d at 914 n.25 (Markey, J.) ("The patent right, solely that of excluding
others, is the fundamental element of all human rights called 'property.' The statutory,
and therefore proper, characterization is not 'patent monopoly,' but 'patent property.');
1 KAYTON, supra, at 1-24 ("The single, critical, necessary condition that distinguishes
property with respect to a res from other things of value is that the owner of the res
has the right to exclude the rest of the world from enjoyment of and dominion over
[it].") (original emphasis).
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knowledge.' 0 Second, the patent also is of value to the public because
the inventor must disclose his invention to the public to obtain the
exclusive right." This disclosure will hopefully stimulate others to add
to the sum of human knowledge through the creation of other inventions utilizing the lessons learned by the patentee. 2 The theoretical
problem in the present interpretation of the doctrine of equivalents
arises from the fact that the doctrine and the Federal Circuit each
represent one of the opposite extreme goals of patent law.
In 1982, Congress created a new federal circuit court of appeals
to unify the field of patent law. Prior to the creation of the Federal
Circuit, appellate opinions touching on questions of patent validity and
infringement were decided by every federal appellate court in the United
States. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the
Court of Custom and Patent Appeals decided the appeals taken from
3
decisions of the Patent and Trademark Office ("Patent Office").'
Patent infringement decisions, which could be decided in any federal
district court 14 and which also often touched on matters of patent
10. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974); Graver Tank
& Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
11. As part of the requirements for a valid patent application, the applicant must
disclose the proper use and/or manufacture of the patentable invention as well as the
scope of the subject matter which the inventor feels the invention encompasses.
Disclosure of the proper use and/or manufacture of the invention is included in the
specification. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 (1988) (requiring a written explanation in "full,
clear, concise, and exact terms," understandable by "any person skilled in the art,"
and presented in the "best mode contemplated" by the inventor). The disclosure of
the scope of the invention is presented in the claims of the application. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, 2 (1988) ("The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as
his invention.").
12. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607; see Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft

Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) ("From their inception, the federal patent laws
have embodied a careful balance between the need to promote innovation and the
recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to
invention itself and the very life blood of a competitive economy."); HARMON, supra
note 9, § 1.3, at 9.
13. If the appeal was taken directly from the Patent Office Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences, the United States Court of Custom and Patent Appeals had
appellate jurisdiction. 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1986). If a civil action was brought to obtain
a patent by court order, this action had to be filed in the District Court for the District
of Columbia, 35 U.S.C. § 145 (1986), with appellate jurisdiction then being to the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1986).
For background on the Court of Custom and Patent Appeals, see generally, 3
DONALD S. CInSUM, PATENTS § 11.06[3][b] (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1992).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents .... ").
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validity, 5 were appealed to the appropriate circuit corresponding to
16
that federal district court.
Congress decided that the situation was becoming intolerable.
Congress feared that the diversity in opinions from the different
appellate jurisdictions was leading to forum-shopping, which "demeans
the entire judicial process and the patent system as well."' 7 In addition,
Congress also perceived that the diversity in opinions was defeating
important business interests by preventing reliance on the patent system
and thereby stifling innovation in the marketplace." Lastly, dissatisfied
with the apparent anti-patent bias of the Supreme Court, Congress
may have also reasoned that a decrease in the diversity of opinions
would remove the influence of the Court over the field of patent law
by eliminating a major source of possible certiorari jurisdiction. 9
In the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 20 Congress merged
the Court of Custom and Patent Appeals with the Court of Claims
and replaced them with the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 2'
Congress gave the Federal Circuit nationwide appellate jurisdiction over
all matters involving the validity of patents and the infringement of
patent rights to improve the certainty of the patent system for the
public and for industry. 22 The Federal Circuit has consistently viewed
this assignment from Congress as their prime directive. 23
15. Patent validity is a defense at law to the infringement action. 35 U.S.C. §
282 (1988).
The following shall be defenses in any action involving the ... infringement
of a patent and shall be pleaded: . .. (2) Invalidity of the patent ... on any

ground specified in part II of this title as a condition for patentability, (3)
Invalidity of the patent .

.

. for failure to comply with and requirement of

sections 112 or 251 of this title ....
Id. If the patent is invalid, then infringer cannot be liable for infringement.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988) ("The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction
of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States .... ").

17. S. REP. No. 275, 97th. Cong., 2d Sess. 2-7 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15.
18. S. REp. No. 275, 97th. Cong., 2d Sess. 2-7 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15-16.
19. Martin J. Adelman, The New World of Patents Created by the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 20 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 979, 984-87 (1987) [hereinafter

Adelman, New World].
20. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.
21. S. REp. No. 275, 97th. Cong., 2d Sess. 2-7 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15-16. The Congress also instituted a new Article I court, the United
States Claims Court, to replace the former Court of Claims and to assume its trial
jurisdiction. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25,
27; S. REp. No. 275, 97th. Cong., 2d Sess. 2-7 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
11, 12.

22. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have
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On the other hand, the doctrine of equivalents has always been

viewed by the courts as a protection for the patentee against the
"unscrupulous copyist" and the like. 24 While recognizing some certainty
must exist for the public, the Court has recognized that, in the absence
of the doctrine, the patentee would be deprived of the benefit of the

invention."
So while the Federal Circuit was created to favor certainty for

the public and business interests, the doctrine of equivalents was
exclusive jurisdiction (1) of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United
States

. .

. if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on

section 1338 [giving exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases to the federal
district courts] of this title...
(4) of an appeal from a decision of- (A) the Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences of the Patent and Trademark Office ... (B) the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks .

.

. or (C) a district court to which a case

was directed pursuant to section 145 or 146 of title 35 [civil action to obtain a
patent or in case of an interference].
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1988); see also Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25; Christianson v. Colt. Indus. Operation Corp., 486 U.S. 800,
807-13 (1988) (outlining the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit).
23. See Helen W. Nies, The Federal Circuit: A Courtfor the Future, 41 Am.

U. L. REV. 571, 571-72 (1991) (Present Chief Judge, Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit) (stating that the judges of the Federal Circuit are "all dedicated to building
a uniform, stable body of precedent as was the mandate of the Federal Circuit").
Some commentators have praised the actions of the Federal Circuit. Gerald

Sobel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: A Fifth Anniversary Look at
Its Impact on Patent Law and Litigation, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 1087, 1091-92 (1988).

Others caution that the court may be trying to do too much too quickly, handing
down various forms of confusing dicta and straying from the issues involved in the
specific case before the court. Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422,
1441 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (Davis, J., concurring); Weiner v. Rollform, Inc., 744 F.2d
797, 811-12 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (Nichols, J., concurring).
Generally the Supreme Court has left the Federal Circuit to deal with the area
of patent law without its constant supervision. Adelman, New World, supra note 19,
at 986. Since 1982, only a very limited number of cases have been taken up on
certiorari by the Supreme Court from the Federal Circuit. Those cases which the
Court has chosen to deal with have primarily concerned issues of procedure rather
than substantive patent law. Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990)
(issue: infringement exemption for pharmaceuticals under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1));
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operation Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988) (issue: appellate
jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338); Dennison Mfg.
v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809 (1986) (issue: standard of review according to FED.
R. Civ. P. 52(a) for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103).
24. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607
(1950).
25. Id.
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created to favor the interests of the patentee. When these two forces,
the doctrine of equivalents and the Federal Circuit, collided, there
was bound to be some excitement.
III.

ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE CONFLICT: THE EVOLUTION OR
DEVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS?

Presently, the patent holder, or patentee, has two possible ways
of showing that the accused device infringes the patented device,
providing the basis for damages or an injunction, or both. The first
way in which the patentee can prove infringement is known as literal
infringement. 26 Literal infringement is a two-step process.2 7 First, the
court must ascertain the patented device from the claims of the
patent. 28 Secondly, the accused device is compared against the patented
26. See generally 4 CHISUM, supra note 13, ch.16; HARMON, supra note 9, §
6.2; RONALD HILDRETH, PATENT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE, chs. 9, 10 (1988);

1 KAYTON, supra note 9, at 2-13 to 2-20.
27. E.g., Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
HARMON, supra note 9, § 6.2, at 159.
28. E.g., Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Prods. Co., 793 F.2d
1279, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 1986); HARMON, supra note 9, § 6.2(a)(i), at 159-60. This is a
question of law. Mannesmann, 793 F.2d at 1282.
The modern claiming system is a peripheral definition system, where the claims
are the boundaries of the patent, serving the same purpose as "metes and bounds"
serve for grants of real property. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Litton Systems, Inc., 720
F.2d 1572, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance
Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938) ("The claims 'measure the invention'.") (citing
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 419 (1908)).
While the patent application can hardly be complete 'without a specification to
support the matter claimed, the changes in the claiming system have elevated the
position' of the claim in ascertaining the boundaries of the patent claim. Therefore,
the claims of the application are emphasized and the specifics of the specification are
omitted as beyond the scope of this paper.
Under the Patent Act of 1952, the patent application must contain a specification and "one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." Patent Act of 1952,
Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 112, 66 Stat. 792, 798. Each claim is then divided into subparts
known as elements. The basic claiming structure can best be further explained with
reference to a series of illustration claims:
I. A chair that comprises a seat, a back angularly disposed to said seat,
and four legs beneath and supporting said seat.
2. A chair that comprises a seat, a resilient cushion on said seat, a back
angularly disposed to said seat, and four legs beneath and supporting said
seat.
3.

A chair that comprises a seat, a resilient cushion on said seat, a back
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device to see if the claims cover the accused device. Only if "every
limitation set forth in a claim [is] found in an accused product or
process exactly" does the claim cover the accused device. 9 If the
claims cover the accused device, the claims are said to "read on" the
device, generally resulting in literal infringement. 0
However, if the court cannot find literal infringement, then the
court may resort to a comparison under the doctrine of equivalents.'
angularly disposed to said seat, a resilient cushion on the face of said back
adjacent to said seat, and four legs beneath and supporting said seat.

ARTHUR SEIDEL, WHAT THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT PATENT

LAW

AND

PRACTICE

§ 5.02, at 60 (4th ed. 1984).

Each of the claims listed above claims the invention of a chair with four legs
and cushions on the back and seat. The first claim contains three elements (seat,
back, and legs), the second contains four elements (seat, back, legs, and seat cushion),
and the third contains five elements (seat, back, legs, seat cushion, and back cushion).
In general, the peripheral claiming system operates under a concept known as
domination. Under domination, broader claims are said to dominate, or encompass
the subject matter of, more narrowly tailored claims. HARMON, supra note 9, §
1.1(b), at 5. Furthermore, a broader claim possesses fewer elements than a more
narrowly drawn claim as each element represents a limitation placed on the claim.
SEIDEL, supra, § 5.02, at 60. Therefore, in the illustration claims given above, claim
one dominates claim two, and both claims one and two dominate claim three.
Broader claims will encompass narrower claims in the fashion described when
open-ended language is used in drafting the patent claims. Generally, there are three
types of language which can be used in a claim: open ("compromising"), closed
("consisting of"), and partially closed ("consisting essentially of"). See generally 2
CHISUM, supra note 13, § 8.06[1][b], at 8-99 to 8-104; 1 KAYTON, supra note 9, at 213 to 2-17. The latter two types of language are only rarely used, and then only with
chemical compounds. 1 KAYTON, supra note 9, at 2-16 to 2-17. The closed language
can only be encompassed by a claim with identically the same elements as the drafted
claim, Id. at 2-16, partially closed only by a claim where the additional elements do
not interfere with the interaction of the element in the partially closed drafted claim.
Id. at 2-17.
29. E.g., Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989);
Stewart-Warner Corp. v. City of Pontiac, 767 F.2d 1563, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
HARMON, supra note 9, §§ 6.2(a)(i), 6.2(a)(ii).
30. Generally, when the accused device falls within the literal meaning of the

claim of the patent, literal infringement occurs. However, as the doctrine of equivalents is an equitable doctrine, and is used to eliminate any injustice in patent
infringement cases, the doctrine of equivalents can be applied to prevent injustice

either when literal infringement does not occur but equitably infringement should
occur or when literal infringement does occur and equitably it should not. Graver
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950). When the
doctrine is applied to. prevent literal infringement, the doctrine is called by another
name: the doctrine of reverse equivalents. The doctrine of reverse equivalents applies
when the accused product performs the function of the claimed product in a
substantially different way. See, e.g., id; SRI Int'l v. Matusushita Elec. Corp. of
Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
31. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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INC.: ELEMENT-BY-

While it did not do much to unify the divided panels, the en
banc decision of Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.32 is a
perhaps one of the best illustrations of how the charge of Congress
to create certainty permeates the decisions of the Federal Circuit with
respect to the doctrine of equivalents. Pennwalt is also a good example
of how the search for certainty has only resulted in further confusion
of the doctrine of equivalents.
1. Prelude to the storm
The modern formulation of the doctrine of equivalents traces its
origins to the decision of Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde
Air Products Co." In Graver Tank, an infringement action was
32. 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
33. 339 U.S. 605 (1950). Graver Tank varied very little from the opinion that
originally gave rise to the doctrine of equivalents, Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330
(1853).
Winans dealt with a patent which claimed the invention of a railroad car in the
shape of an inverted conic frustrum topped with a cylinder. Id. at 339. The shape of
the car was used to equalize the transfer of the load of the material transported,
usually coal, to the walls of the railroad car, thereby allowing, among other
improvements, an improvement in the ratio of material carried to railroad car weight.
Id. at 339-40. The accused infringer manufactured a railroad car in the shape of an
inverted octagonal frustrum topped with an octagonal box, which showed a similar
performance improvement. Id. at 340.
The majority of the Court, favoring a liberal interpretation of the claim
language, easily found the claimed invention and the manufacture equivalent, although not using these exact terms.
Now, while it is undoubtedly true, that the patentee may so restrict his claim
as to cover less than what he invented, or may limit it to one particular
form of machine, excluding all other forms, though they also embody his
invention, yet such an interpretation should not be put upon his claim...
Because specifications are to be construed liberally...
Id. at 341 (note the reliance in the central definition system on the specification
rather than the claims). The "equivalency test" was given by the majority as
"substantially . . * embody the patentee's operation, and thereby obtain the same
kind of result as was reached by [the] invention." Id. at 344. The test was stated
only slightly differently by the dissent, as "substantially on the same principle and
in the same mode of operation, accomplish the same result." Id. at 346 (Campbell,
J., dissenting).
But not only did the precedent call for liberal interpretation of the patent's
language, argued the Court, but so did common sense. It was a practical impossibility,
concluded the majority, that a perfect conical frustrum could ever be manufactured.
Id. at 343. Therefore, the patent implicitly also covered reasonable approximations
to the conic frustrum, or the patent would be meaningless. See id. at 344.
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brought by the manufacturer of an electric welding flux. The Graver
Tank patent claimed a flux combination of an alkaline earth metal
silicate and calcium fluoride.34 Specifically, the Graver Tank flux
contained silicates of two earth metals, calcium and magnesium. 35 The
infringer substituted manganese, which is not an alkaline earth metal,
for magnesium. 36
While the substitution avoided the question of a literal infringement of the Graver Tank patent," the district court and the Supreme
Court found enough similarities between the two elements' behavior
to justify the holding that the two elements were equivalents of each
other.3 8 The Court started the opinion with a strongly worded paragraph denouncing the piracy which might occur in the absence of
such a result.3 9 The Court noted that without the doctrine, the
incentive to disclose, provided by the protection given to the patentee
by the patent grant, would be rendered void and concealment would
be the norm. 4°
The Court then uttered the oft quoted words: "[A] patentee may
invoke [the doctrine of equivalents] to proceed against the producer
of a device 'if it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result." ' ' 41 This test for
equivalence has become known as the function-way-result test.42
While the application of such a test appeared facially simple, in
practice this was not always true. One of the major questions which
arose with respect to the doctrine was if the doctrine would be applied
element-by-element or to the device as-a-whole. As a result, when the
Federal Circuit approached the question, two different camps formed
as to the correct method of application.4 3 Although, according to the
34. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 610
(1950).
35. Id.

36. Id.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.at 612.
Id.at 611-12.
Id.at 607.
Id.

41. Id. at 608 (citing Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42

(1929)).
42. Adelman, New World, supra note 19, at 996.
43. Compare Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n,

805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (as-a-whole); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,
717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (as-a-whole) with Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (element-by-element); Lemelson v. United
States, 752 F.2d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (element-by-element).
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rules of procedure in effect in the Federal Circuit, the first decision
should have been precedential as to all subsequent panels," the two
lines coexisted for quite some time.

The earlier line of cases, using an as-a-whole analysis, traced its
origins to Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States.45 In Hughes, the

federal government was defending a judgement of non-infringement

involving a patent held by Hughes claiming a process for stabilizing

satellites and unmanned spacecraft." Under the Hughes patent, the
satellite required interactive feedback with a ground station to control
velocity and orientation. 4 The government satellite, while utilizing the

same means for velocity and orientation control, did not require
feedback with a ground control station. 48 Rather, the government
satellite processed the information internally.49
While the court was unable to find literal infringement because

the Hughes patent was not written to cover a situation where the
control was handled internally,50 the court went on to find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 5 After citing the Graver Tank

function-way-result test,5 2 the court determined the critical question

would be the way prong of the analysis." Noting that Graver Tank
specified nothing more than "obvious and exact equivalents," the
court stated: "The failure to apply the doctrine of equivalents to the

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Nies, supra note 23, at 572.
717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1360.
Id. at 1360-61.

49. Id.

50. Id. at 1361.
51. In deciding to apply the doctrine, the court firsi addressed the pioneer-nonpioneer status of the invention. Id. at 1362. The pioneer-non-pioneer status of the
patent can effect the range of equivalents assigned to a claim by the court, and is
decided before proceeding on with the analysis. Pioneer status is given to those
inventions which are "wholly novel." Boyden-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S.
537, 569 (1898). An invention given pioneer status is afforded a greater range of
equivalents, while inventions in a crowded art, at the other end of the spectrum, are
allowed a lesser range. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Litton Systems, Inc., 720 F.2d 1572,
1580 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1362. Some courts and authors have
questioned the applicability of this limitation on the modern doctrine of equivalents.
Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 401 (Ct. Cl. 1967); 4 CHISUM,
supra note 13, § 18.04[2](c), at 18-111 to 18-112 n.20.
52. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1361.
53. Id.at 1364. In practice, most doctrine of equivalents analyses revolve
around the way prong of the analysis. See Adelman, New World, supra note 19, at
996.
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claimed invention as a whole, and the accompanying demand for

'obvious and exact' equivalents of two elements the presence of which
54
would have effectively produced literal infringement, was error."

Because of several overall striking similarities in the way in which the
patented device and the accused device operated, the court found
equivalency as-a-whole."

This analysis was also followed by the court in Texas Instruments,

Inc. v. United States InternationalTrade Commission. 6 Texas Instru-

ments was seeking to prevent certain imported portable calculators

from entering the country because the devices allegedly infringed one

of Texas Instruments' patents." Specifically, the calculators allegedly
infringed several claims, written in means-plus-function language,58
covering the processing and storage of arithmetic functions by the
computer 9
In recognizing the difference between equivalency as part of the
literal infringement analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 112 and the doctrine

of equivalents, the court stated:

In the case of literal infringement of a claim containing a
"means" clause in terms of section 112 paragraph 6, the
accused structure, composition, or process is compared with
that described in the specification for performing the claimed
function. In the case of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents, the accused structure, composition, or process is

compared with the claimed invention as a whole.60
54. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1364.
55. Id. at 1364-66.

56. 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
57. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d
1558, 1560-61 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
58. A slightly more sophisticated claiming structure used in the peripheral
claiming system, often arising in doctrine of equivalents cases, is the means-plusfunction claim. Again, the best way to describe the claiming structure is through the
use of illustration claims:
la. A chair that comprises a seat, a back angularly disposed to said seat, four legs
beneath said seat, and screws securing each leg to the seat.
lb. A chair that comprises a seat, a back angularly disposed to said seat, four legs
beneath said seat, and a means for securing each legs to the seat.
The first and second claims differ only in the language describing the type of
attachment used. However, while the first claim only claims attachment through the
use of screws, the second claim claims any equivalent form of attachment (e.g.
screws, glue, nails, welding, etc.).
59. Texas Instruments, 805 F.2d at 1561.
60. Id. at 1571.
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At the same time the as-i-whole analysis was evolving in Hughes
and Texas Instruments, a second line of cases began to use an elementby-element approach to the doctrine of equivalents. The seminal case
for the element-by-element analysis was Lemelson v. United States.61
In Lemelson, an appeal was taken from the dismissal of a cause of
action for infringement and a second judgement of non-infringement. 62 All of the patents involved coordinate measuring machines
63
used in conjunction with automated programmable machine tools.
Although the court cited Hughes for the general proposition that
equivalency is a question of fact, 64 the court adopted a position
contrary to the as-a-whole approach adopted in Hughes. The court
stated: "It is also well settled that each element of a claim is material
and essential, and that in order for a court to find infringement, the
plaintiff must show the presence of every element or its substantial
equivalent in the accused device."61 5 Because the court was unable to
find a substantial equivalent for the manipulation means in the
accused device, infringement under the doctrine of equivalents was

avoided .66

The next major step in the evolution of the element-by-element
analysis prior to Pennwalt came in Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.67 While adopting the element-by-element approach set out in Lemelson 6 1 this case significantly clarified the
element-by-element approach. In Perkin-Elmer, the trial court had
found that the plaintiff's patent for an electrodeless discharge lamp
was not infringed by the accused device under the doctrine of equivalents. 69 While the plaintiff's patent called for tap coupling, the
Westinghouse patent called for loop coupling between the central coil
and the power source. 0
To begin the analysis, Perkin-Elmer court interpreted Hughes in
accordance with the element-by-element analysis used by the court in
Lemelson. Perkin-Elmer read Hughes to state that when examining
each element of the device, the element must be viewed in the context
61. 752 F.2d 1538 (Fed.
62. Lemelson v. United
63. Id.
64. Id.at 1550.
65. Id.at 1551.
66. Id.
67. 822 F.2d 1528 (Fed.
68. Perkin-Elmer Corp.
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
69. Id. at 1529.
70. Id. at 1531-32.

Cir. 1985).
States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

Cir. 1987).
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1533
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of the entire claim. 7' The rule remained, however, that each element
is material and essential, and a substantial equivalent of the element
72
must be found in the accused device for equivalency to occur.
The court also explained specifically what it meant when referring
to an "element." Rather than referring to a physical element of the
device, the term element was to be read as referring to an element of
the claim. 7 Therefore, in reality, the court was referring to the
limitations contained in the claims, which could refer to physical
74
elements, but could also include descriptive terms.
With two divergent views on the correct application of the
doctrine, the clouds gathered for the "final" and definitive word on
the matter by the court en banc.
2.

The storm breaks7

At issue in Pennwalt76 were two fruit sorting devices. The patentee's device sorted the fruit by color, or weight, or a combination of
the two. 77 The sorter first weighed the fruit and then produced an
electronic signal proportional to the weight of the item. 78 This electronic signal could then either be compared to a reference signal or
combined with a signal produced by the device when the fruit passed
through the optical scanner and then the combined signal would be
71. Id. at 1532-33. This interpretation is particularly troublesome in light of
the remarks made by Judge Davis in the dissent to Hughes. Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1366-68 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Davis, J., dissenting). Judge
Davis specifically found fault with the majority opinion for not giving proper regard
to the specific claims of the patent, but instead viewing the patented invention as an
entirety. Id. at 1366.
72. Perkin-Elmer, 822 F.2d at 1533.
73. Id. at 1533 n.9.
74. Id.
75. See generally ARNOLD, WHITE & DURKEE, 1988-89 PATENT LAW HANDBOOK
§ 4.02 (1988); 4 CHISUM, supra note 13, § 18.04[1], at 18-89 to 18-100; 1 KAYTON,
supra note 9, at 2-23 to 2-27; Adelman, New World, supra note 19; Gregory J.
Smith, The Federal Circuit'sModern Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Infringement,
29 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 901 (1989); Sobel, supra note 23; William E. Eshelman,
Comment, The Doctrine of Equivalents in PatentLaw: Post-PennwaltDevelopments,
65 TUL. L. REV. 883 (1991); Emily Lau, Note, The Test for Patent Infringement
Under the Doctrine of Equivalents After Pennwalt v. Durand-Wayland, 22 IND. L.
REV. 849 (1989); Frank S. Molinaro, Note, Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland,
Inc. - The Federal Circuit Redefines the Doctrine of Equivalents, 38 DEPAUL L.
REV. 787 (1989).
76. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
77. Id. at 933.
78. Id.
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compared to a reference signal.7 9 After comparison, a separate signal
would be sent to discharge the fruit at the correct time into the correct
container. 0 All of the operations were carried out by "hard-wired"
circuitry, 81 including the determination of location, which was done
through the use of shift registers. 2
The Durand-Wayland devices also sorted the fruit on the basis
of weight, or color, or a combination of both.8 3 The Durand-Wayland
devices, however, used software to perform the comparisons of weight
and color data stored in the microprocessor8 4 and to track fruit, not
by location, but by the position of the fruit's data in the data queues.8"
The majority used what they termed an element-by-element analysis to find that the Durand-Wayland device did not infringe on the
Pennwait patent.8 6 The court quoted from Lemelson that "each
79. Id.
80. Id.

81. Theoretically, all computer designs can be implemented either as hardware,
or software, or as a hybrid of hardware and software known as firmware. Pamuela

Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protectionfor Computer
Programsin Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 677.
Given a precise definition of a computer, it is always possible to realize the

computer in hardware, that is, to construct a hardware device whose machine

language is precisely that of the defined computer .... In suggesting this

possibility we are appealing to the important basic principle behind computer
design: Any precisely defined algorithm or data structure may be realized
in hardware. Because a computer is simply a collection of algorithms and
data structures, we may assume that its hardware realization is possibility,
regardless of the complexity of the computer or its associated machine
language.
THOMAS PRATT, PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

1984).

19 (2d ed.

Hardware applications often are said to be "hard-wired." This designation is
a recognition of the basic difference in implementation of the computer design.
Hardware implementations use digital logic circuits connected by wires to produce
the desired logic while software implementations exist only as volatile binary information. Duncan Davidson, Reverse EngineeringSoftware Under Copyright Law: The
IBM PC BIOS, in OWNING SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION 147, 147 (Vivian
Weil & John Snapper eds., 1989).

82. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (indicating means).
83. Id. at 933. Durand-Wayland produced two separate devices, which together
performed the sorting of the single Pennwalt device. The "Microsizer" only sorted
by weight, while the "Microsorter" only sorted by color. Id. The two devices could
be combined, using the appropriate software, to sort by both color and weight. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 935-36.

86. Id. at 935.
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element of a claim is material and essential. . . [so that for infringement to occur] the plaintiff must show the presence of every element
or its substantial equivalent.' '87 After majority affirmed the district
court's decision that there was no literal infringement,"' the majority
compared each of the elements of the patented device to the elements
of the Durand-Wayland device and found that several of the patented
device or equivalents thereof were missing or "substantially different"
than elements in the Durand-Wayland device.8 9 Specifically, the court
found that the indicating means were not present in the DurandWayland device, and that the data queues were not a substantial
equivalent for those means. Therefore, the Durand-Wayland device
failed to infringe on the Pennwalt sorter patent.
The dissent, in favor of the as-a-whole analysis, 90 attacked the
majority opinion on two separate grounds. The dissent argued that
the majority opinion effectively overruled sub silentio the Graver
Tank opinion, which the Federal Circuit did not have the power to
do as an inferior court. 9' In addition, the dissent argued that the
majority opinion effectively but erroneously overruled prior Federal
Circuit precedent.92 The dissent described the new analytic framework
constructed by the majority as being nothing more than a rework of
87. Id.
88. Id. at 934
89. Id. at 935-36.
90. Id. at 939 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
91. Id. (Bennett, J., dissenting).
92. Id. (Bennett, J., dissenting).
Although the dissenters in Pennwalt were convinced that Hughes was in fact
an as-a-whole application, this interpretation does not necessarily follow. In PerkinElmer, Chief Justice Markey, who authored the Hughes opinion, stated that under
Hughes the court may use an element-by-element analysis as long as each element is
viewed in context with the entire claim. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Co., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532-35 nn.3-5 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Smith, supra note 75, at 901.
In addition, the second case in the line relied upon by the Pennwalt dissent,
Texas Instruments, was criticized at the time of the decision as introducing a totally
new analysis into the doctrine of equivalents. See William Nieman, The Federal
Circuit Resolves Ambiguities in the Doctrine of Equivalents, 70 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
153, 154-55 (1988).
The Texas Instruments opinion was greeted by a firestorm of criticism from
the patent bar ....

The [American Intellectual Property Law Association]

interpreted the Texas Instruments opinion as signalling a rejection of an
element-by-element infringement analysis under Section 112(6), or the doctrine of equivalents in favor of viewing the claimed invention 'as a whole'
divorced from adherence to claim language.
Id. Alternatively, some authors have suggested that implicit in Texas Instruments is
an element-by-element analysis. Lau, supra note 75, at 868.
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the literal infringement analysis already rejected by the court prior to
reaching the doctrine of equivalents analysis.9 3 The dissent also was
at odds with what it described as a return to the viewpoint of the
dissent of Graver Tank, a favoring of the protection of the public
over the interests of the inventor.94
3.

"[Full of sound and fury, signifying nothing. "9

The element-by-element approach of the majority in Pennwalt
added certainty of procedure for the court and certainty of claims for
the public. On its face, it would appear that the absence of any
element in the accused device which was claimed in the patent would
avoid the doctrine of equivalents. In fact, the court has been quick
to re-emphasize this point: "It is now settled that each element of the
claim is material and essential and, in order to find infringement, the
patent owner must show the presence of every element or its substantial equivalent in the accused device." 96
But, as is the case with many of the analytical solutions proposed
to restrict the doctrine of equivalents, the element-by-element analysis
itself has been limited in its effectiveness by the taint of equity arising
from the origins of the doctrine.9 7 This taint has expressed itself not
only in slight ameliorations of the strict element-by-element framework, 98 but also in open opposition to the applicability of the Pennwalt
analysis .99
93. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 940 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (Bennett, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 945-48 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
95. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act V, sc. 5.
96. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 846 F.2d
1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Nies, J., dissenting).
97. Maxim H. Waldbaum & David Sipiora, Pennwalt Redux: Certainty v.
Procrustean Bed, 19 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. Assoc. Q.J. 237, 239 (1991).
Reacting to what may have been perceived to be an excessively flexible
application of the doctrine of equivalents in prior Federal Circuit decisions,
the Pennwalt majority eschewed flexibility in favor of certainty. Ironically,
however, the consequence has been an increase rather than a decrease in the
uncertainty attendant to the application of the doctrine of equivalents ....

Id.

98. Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251 (Fed.
Cir. 1989).
99. See Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 939 F.2d 1540, 1544 (Fed. Cir.
1991) ("Moreover, the district court's opinion does not indicate that it failed to

consider the operation of the invention and the accused deflector as a whole.");

Allied Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 850 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
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One of the more unusual ameliorations of the Pennwalt analysis
came in Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Electric U.S.A., Inc.1°°
The trial court had found that the Sumitomo optical waveguide fibers
infringed Corning Glass' patent under the doctrine of equivalents.10
The Corning Glass patent claimed a positively doped core to provide
a difference in the index of refraction between the core and the
cladding layer. 0 2 The Sumitomo fibers used a negative dopant in the
cladding to vary the index. 103
°4
Although the court restated the element-by-element analysis,'
the court did not mechanically follow the expected analysis. The
expected analysis would require every element to be represented by a
substantial equivalent in the accused device. If an element, or limitation, is missing, equivalence cannot be found. In fact, Sumitomo
argued that the lack of an equivalent to the positive dopant in the
core of the fiber prevented a finding of equivalence. 05
While the court agreed that an element could be interpreted either
as a limitation or series of limitations, the court disagreed that the
important element in the Corning Glass patent was "missing."' ' 0 To
be "missing" the limitation did not necessarily have to be found in
1988) ("ITC's opinion evidences that it considered the effect of the lone difference
between the HML and VAC processes and the patented process on the working of

those processes as wholes .... That was not error."); Andrew Corp. v. Gabriel

Elec., Inc., 847 F.2d 819, 825 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Relying on the totality of similarities

between the accused device and the claimed structure . . .the district court found

that the accused antennas perform the same function in substantially the same way

to achieve substantially the same result . . .No clear error having been shown, the

district court's finding of infringement is affirmed."). But see, e.g., Becton Dickinson
& Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 798 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("But whether necessary
or not, after issuance, all limitations in a claim are material and must be met exactly
or equivalently in an accused device to find the accused device works in the same
way."); Labounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 867 F.2d 1572,
1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("On this point our precedent instructs that substantially the
same way is shown if every limitation of a claim is satisfied either exactly or by a
substantial equivalent in the accused device.").
100. 868 F.2d 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also Intel Corp. v. United States Int'l
Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding one-to-one correspondence not necessary as function not performed by corresponding component existing
"somewhere in the device").
101. Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1253
(Fed. Cir. 1989).
102. Id. at 1256.
103. Id.at 1259.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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the corresponding component, but rather "somewhere in the accused
device."' 07
This "enlightened" version of the element-by-element analysis
finds some support in other decisions of the court. However, these
decisions do not mince words and merely ameliorate the analytical
approach. One example is Sun Studs, Inc. v. A TA Equipment Leasing,
Inc. 108 In Sun Studs, the court again stated that "[one-to-one correspondence of components is not required."' 9 However, instead of
stating that the analysis applied should be considered as element-byelement, the court clearly stated that under this analysis: "The claimed
and accused devices must be viewed and evaluated as a whole."" ' 0
Furthermore, the court in Sun Studs is not alone. Several panels
of the court have taken the opportunity to return to the as-a-whole
analysis when dealing with patent infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents."' While some of the opinions can possibly be reconciled
with Pennwait by interpreting the as-a-whole language as referring to
taking the limitation in context of the claim, other decisions rely
exclusively on a totality of the similarities between the accused and
patented devices.
The resistance of members of the court to the en banc decision
of the court in Pennwait is merely indicative of the greater problem
of the court creating confusion through their attempts to create
certainty in doctrine of equivalents.1 2 While the Pennwalt analysis

107. Id.
108. 872 F.2d 978 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
109. Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equipment Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978, 989 (Fed.
Cir. 1989).
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 939 F.2d 1540, 1544 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) ("Moreover, the district court's opinion does not indicate that it failed to
consider the operation of the invention and the accused deflector as a whole.");
Allied Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 850 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1988) ("ITC's [International Trade Commission] opinion evidences that it considered
the effect of the lone difference between the HML and VAC processes and the
patented process on the working of those processes as wholes."); Andrew Corp. v.
Gabriel Elec., Inc., 847 F.2d 819, 825 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Relying on the totality of
similarities between the accused device and the claimed structure ... the district

court found that the accused antennas perform the same function in substantially the
same way to achieve substantially the same result .... No clear error having been

shown, the district court's finding of infringement is affirmed.").
112. In fact, some authors have advocated presenting both analyses to the court
to be certain of meeting the burden of persuasion. See Lau, supra note 75, at 87478.
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provides one illustration of the problem, it is by no means the only
illustration.
B.

3
WILSON SPORTING GOODS AND THE HYPOTHETICAL CLAIM'

4

Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates"
involved the design of golf balls. As the United States Golf Association
strictly controls many of the other parameters of the golf ball,
manufacturers have done a great deal of research on correct dimple
placement to improve the golf ball's performance (height and distance)." 5 Wilson's researcher divided the golf ball's surface into an6
imaginary "icosahedron," composed of twenty equilateral triangles."
These triangles were further divided by six circles which encompass
the ball and were known as "great circles."" ' 7 The Wilson patent
claimed an arrangement where the dimples were placed so that none
touched a great circle."'
Dunlop, a competing manufacturer, produced a golf ball with a
slightly different placement of dimples such that the great circles were
not entirely dimple free."' Dunlop suggested that if the doctrine of
equivalents was used to find infringement on the Wilson patent, then
the doctrine would be limited by prior art, in the form of a United
States patent assigned to Uniroyal, another golf ball manufacturer,
120
and a British patent issued to Pugh, a private inventor.
Judge Rich, part of the majority in Pennwalt, introduced in
Wilson a new analysis for analyzing prior art as a limitation on the
doctrine of equivalents. Under the "hypothetical claim" analysis, the
113. See generally PATRICIA BRANTLEY, 1991-92 PATENT LAW HANDBOOK §
4.03[1] (1991); 4 CmSUM, supra note 13, § 18.04[2][d]; HARMON, supra note 9, §
6.3(a)(iii); Timothy Malloy, Infringement Analysis: Claims Dependent on Noninfringed Claims (Apr. 4, 1991) (written for the IPLAC Doctrine of Equivalents
Seminar); Henrik D. Parker, Doctrine of Equivalents Analysis After Wilson Sporting
Goods: The Hypothetical Claim Hydra, 18 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. Assoc. Q.J. 262
(1990); Lewis Steadman, Doctrine of Equivalents Boundary Line (Apr. 4, 1991)
(written for the IPLAC Doctrine of Equivalents Seminar); John Witherspoon, Wilson
Sporting Goods: Clarification or Confusion, 42 PAT. TRADEMARK COPYRIGHT J.217
(1991).
11-4. 904 F.2d 677 (Fed.Cir. 1990).
115. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffery & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677,

678-79 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
116. Id.at 679.
117. Id.
118. Id.

119. Id.at 681.
120. Id.at 680-81.
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patentee is to present to the court a "hypothetical claim" which
literally covers the accused device. 21 The plaintiff-patentee then has
the burden of proving the validity of the hypothetical claim to the
court. 122 The hypothetical claim does not get the benefit of a presumption of the validity which is normally given to the previously
prosecuted claim because the claim is treated as if the claim was being
submitted to the Patent Office.' 23 If the hypothetical claim would not
be allowed by the Patent Office, in the court's opinion, then the prior
art acts as a bar to the doctrine of equivalents; if the claim would be
allowed, then the prior art does not act as a bar to the doctrine of

equivalents. 124

At the outset, Wilson would seem to provide a concrete framework for handling a prior art limitation under the doctrine of equivalents, improving the certainty of the doctrine overall by improving
the certainty of this limitation. However, as was the case after
Pennwalt, the Federal Circuit has modified the hypothetical claim
analysis in several ways which merely add confusion to the doctrine.
The Federal Circuit has attempted, in varying degrees of clarity, to
explain the limitations, if any, on the patentability rules applicable to
the hypothetical claim. In addition, the Federal Circuit has made
statements which intimate that the "hypothetical claim" analysis may
not be mandatory in every doctrine of equivalents application.
Although Wilson stated that the "hypothetical claim" analysis
would allow the "use of traditional patentability rules," the court
failed to be more specific as to which rules were to be included as
"traditional" (e.g. obviousness, utility, novelty, statutory bars). 25 In
Key Manufacturing Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 126 the court explained that the Wilson hypothetical claim analysis "does not envision
application of a full blown patentability analysis."'' 27 While "fullblown patentability analysis" does not seem to limit the allowable
rules any more significantly than Wilson, some direction may be
121. Id. at 684.

122. Id. at 685.

123. Id.

124. Id. at 684.

125. Id.

126. 925 F.2d 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Both Key and Microdot manufactured
capped wheel nuts. Key Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1445

(Fed. Cir. 1991). The top of the Microdot wheel nut had a fifteen degree tapered
surface, while the Key wheel nut had no taper on its top surface. Id. at 1447. There
were also differences in the amount of contact between the decorative cap and the
nut. Id.
127. Id. at 1449.
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gleaned from the fact that Key Manufacturing Group only used the
28 to show the "hypothetical claim" was barred by
obviousness test1
129
art.
the prior
The court applied a slightly different set of rules in We Care,
Inc. v. Ultra-Mark Int'l Corp.30 In We Care, the court specifically
referred to anticipation' as well as obviousness as applicable to the
128. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
The requirement of non-obviousness as a condition for patentability is contained
in 35 U.S.C. § 103. The test adopted by both the Patent Office and the Federal
Circuit, see 1 KAYTON, supra note 9, at 5-16 to 5-25, was handed down by the
Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). Basically, there
are four factual inquiries to the Graham non-obviousness test:
[Tihe scope of the prior art and the content of the prior art are to be
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to
be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved
... Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but
unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the
circumstances surrounding the origins of the subject matter sought to be
patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries have
relevancy.
Id. at 17-18.
A complete discussion of nonobviousness is beyond the scope of this paper, but
one aspect of the Federal Circuit's formulation should be addressed. Of the four
factual findings required by the court, the last finding on secondary considerations
has grown to be the most important item of evidence for the resolution of the
question of nonobviousness. See, e.g., Simons Fastener Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works,
739 F.2d 1573, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1984). In addition to the three types of secondary
evidence mentioned by the Court in Graham, other types include: licenses, copies of
invention by others, unexpected results, skepticism, and independent development.
HARMON, supra note 9, § 4.6(c), at 102-06; 1 KAYTON, supra note 9, at 5-17 to 5-18.
129. Key Manufacturing Group, 925 F.2d at 1449; see Insta-Foam Prods. v.
Universal Foam Sys., 906 F.2d 698, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
130. 930 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1990). We Care involved electrical outlet safety
devices which limited access to the outlet when not in use. The We Care device used
an outlet cover designed in two plates with spring-loaded doors in the back of the
front plate to prevent access when not in use. We Care Inc. v. Ultra-Mark Int'l
Corp., 930 F.2d 1567, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Soon after negotiations to license the
device to Ultra-Mark were terminated, We Care, Inc. v. Ultra-Mark Int'l Corp., 741
F. Supp. 743, 746 (D. Minn. 1989), We Care found that Ultra-Mark had begun to
sell a device very similar to the We Care device, designed with two plates and springloaded doors in the front of the back plate. 741 F. Supp. at 748.
131. Novelty and the statutory bars are closely-related, anticipation-based concepts found in 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). Both novelty and the statutory bars only
apply if the invention exists in one of the forms listed (publication, patent, use, or
on sale). That is, the reference form must be exactly the invention claimed. 1 KAYTON,
supra note 9, at 5-1. This identical reference is referred to as an "anticipatory"
reference. HARMON, supra note 9, § 3.2, at 43-44 ("Under modern decisions,

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 13

prior art limitation analysis. 13 2
Furthermore, the court also added some interesting language to

two of its post-Wilson opinions which seemed to question the applicability of the "hypothetical claim" analysis in all cases. In Key

Manufacturing Group, the court stated that the hypothetical claim is
"not obligatory in every doctrine of equivalents determination."' ' 3
However, the court then proceeded to apply the hypothetical claim
analysis and never specified criteria when the doctrine would and
would not be applicable. Later, in Jurgens v. McKasy, 3 4 the court.
anticipation requires that each and every element of the claimed invention be disclosed
in a single prior art reference."); I KAYTON, supra note 9, at 5-1. These objections
to the validity of claims are rather rare. HARMON, supra note 9, § 3.2, at 43.
Novelty prevents the issuance of a patent to the inventor if the invention has
been published, patented, or used prior to the date of invention. Section 102(a) reads:
[T]he invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent ....
35 U.S.C § 102(a) (1988).
The statutory bars prevent the issuance of a patent if the invention has been
published, patented, used or sold by the inventor more than one year prior to the
effective filing date. Section 102(b) reads:
[Tihe invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this
or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than
one year prior to the date of application for patent in the United States ....
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). The group of statutory bars in section 102 are often
referred to as "loss of right."
Also included under the heading of statutory bar by some authors are the bars
contained in § 102(c) and § 102(d). See I CHISUM, supra note 13, § 3.01, at 3-5;
HARMON, supra note 9, § 3.5, at 70-71. Section 102(c) bars the issuance of the patent
if the inventor has abandoned the application. 35 U.S.C. § 102(c) (1988). The
applicant can abandon the application expressly, see 3 CHIsuM, supra note 13, §
11.03[2][b], at 11-67, through failure to respond to the Patent Office in a timely
fashion, see 3 CmsuM, supra note 13, § 11.03[2][b], at 11-59, or by failing to claim
the subject matter disclosed in the specification. See HLDITH, supra note 26, at 63;
1 KAYTON, supra note 9, at 4-20 to 4-22. Section 102(d) bars the issuance of a patent
if the inventor obtains a patent in a foreign country. 35 U.S.C. § 102(d) (1988).
The remaining sections of 102 are additional miscellaneous reasons for denying
the application, including: invention disclosed in United States patent of another, 35
U.S.C. § 102(e) (1988); only inventor can patent invention, 35 U.S.C. § 102(0 (1988);
and no one may patent the invention of another, 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988).
If any of the elements are missing in the reference, the reference cannot be used
under § 102, but may be used under § 103. HARMON, supra note 9, § 3.2, at 43.
132. We Care, 930 F.2d at 1571. Although this case cites Wilson Sporting Goods
as precedent, the opinion does not mention the hypothetical claim analysis.
133. Key Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1449 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
134. 927 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Jurgens licensed a patent for a windsock
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suggested "it may be helpful to 'conceptualize' the prior art limitation
on the doctrine of equivalents by envisioning a hypothetical
claim. .... "" But again, as in Key Manufacturing Group, the court
the hypothetical claim analysis as in Jurgens as if
proceeded to apply 36
it were mandatory.
IV.

How THE JuDIcIAL RESOLUTION HAS FAILED

Although each of the previously discussed changes to the doctrine
of equivalents will have profound effects on the application and
understanding of the doctrine, perhaps the most interesting changes
to discuss are the changes which may come about in the wake of
Wilson. These effects can be generally divided into changes in patent
trial procedure and patent practice. Furthermore, no discussion of the
changes caused by doctrine would be complete without mentioning
how albering the doctrine has unnecessarily altered allied patent law
doctrines in general.
A.

COMPLICATION OF PATENT PRACTICE

If the court finds in a given case that the alleged infringement was
37
willful, then the damages awarded to the patentee can be tripled' and
3
reasonable attorney fees can be awarded.' To avoid willful infringement, the court must find that, under all the circumstances, "a
duck decoy, which consisted of a goose head, stake and windsock body bag, from
the inventor Shjeflo. Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
McKasy was a distributer of a similar windsock duck decoy. Id. at 1556. The design
of the later duck decoy was created by tracing the body bag of the Jurgens decoy,
obtained at a trade fair, and making modifications to the shape of the bag. Id.
135. Id. at 1561 (emphasis added).
136. Id.; Key Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1449 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
137. 35 U.S.C. § 284, 2 (1988) ("In either event the court may increase the
damages up to three times the amount found or assessed").
138. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1988) ("The court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party."). Willful infringement qualifies the
case as an "exceptional" case. Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d
1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
In a patent infringement case, the attorneys fees can be-quite substantial. Patent
attorneys characteristically charge from 150 to 300 dollars an hour. It is not
uncommon to spend one or two hundred thousand dollars on attorneys fees for one
day of trial work. See 1 L.J. KuTTEN, COMPUTER SOFTWARE 3-47 to 3-48 (1992)
("Patent litigation incurs substantially higher attorney fees than other types of
litigation .... As a result, even a small case can generate more than $200,000 in
attorney fees.").
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reasonable person would prudently conduct himself with any confidence
that a court might hold the patent invalid" or not infringed. 39
One way to satisfy this standard is to obtain an attorney's opinion
on the possibility of infringement, although this is "not dispositive."'4
Nevertheless, prior to the use or manufacture of a new process or
product, an infringement opinion is usually sought to protect the new
user or infringer from charges of willful infringement at trial.' 41
If the Wilson hypothetical claim analysis is viewed as mandatory,
the patent attorney is placed in a difficult position. It is necessary to
investigate the hypothetical claim analysis prior to use or production
to protect the client from charges of willful infringement. 42 As it is
presently unclear what limitations are placed on the hypothetical claim
other than it must encompass the infringer's product or process, 43
the attorney is under a considerable burden. Perhaps Judge Learned
Hand expressed the dilemma the best when he said, "[I]t would result
in an intolerable burden on the public, which would be charged not
only with a knowledge of the prior art at the time of the application
and often earlier, but with a right conclusion as to how much room
was left for invention, seldom an easy question."'"
B. COMPLICATION OF PATENT TRIAL PROCEDURE

Normally, the trial procedure involved in patent litigation is a
very complicated affair. The complex nature of the procedure is
caused in part by the complex series of presumptions and burdens of
proof present at trial.
As in any case, the plaintiff has the option of presenting evidence
first. However, the patent, on which the entire case is based, is
presumed valid' 45 unless the alleged infringer can prove otherwise by
139. Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (1983).
140. Id.at 1577.
141. Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
142. STEADMAN, supra note 103, at 113. However, if the hypothetical claim is
only a device, a tool, for use at trial to help the trier of fact on the issue of
equivalents encompassing the prior art, then the attorney does not have to include
the claim analysis in the opinion as a boundary on infringement and can avoid this
dilemma.
143. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677,
684 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
144. Claude Neon Lights v. E. Machietti & Son, 36 F.2d 574, 576 (2d Cir.
1929).
145. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988) ("A patent shall be presumed valid.").
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a "clear and convincing" showing of evidence. 14 Nonetheless, the
patentee often presents evidence showing the validity of the patent

during the patentee's case-in-chief. This showing is made at the same
time the patentee is attempting to prove infringement, which must be

shown by the patentee according to a "preponderance of the evidence.' '1 47 As a result, the trier of fact often becomes confused as to
who must carry the burden of proving validity and what the correct
4
standard for proving validity should be.'1

With the addition of a "hypothetical claim," further complica-

tions may arise in the procedure of a patent infringement case. Unlike
the claims of the patent, which are afforded the presumption of

validity, the hypothetical claims are not afforded a presumption of

validity and the burden of proof is placed on the patentee as part of
49 If the attorney did not have a suffihis showing of infringement.

ciently difficult responsibility in instructing the trier of fact to correctly
distinguish the burdens and presumptions as to validity previously,

the addition of these other "claims," which may draw in large 50part
from the claims of the patent, may make a fair trial impossible.
C.

COMPLICATION OF ALLIED PATENT DOCTRINES

Furthermore, the Federal Circuit's attempts to restrict the appli-

cation of the doctrine of equivalents have not only complicated the
application of the doctrine of equivalents, but the restrictions have
also complicated the related doctrine of prosecution history, or file
wrapper,'

estoppel. Prosecution history estoppel can act as a limit

on the doctrine of equivalents by preventing the patentee from asserting certain equivalents as a result of the patentee's actions during

146. E.g., Avia Group Int'l Inc. v. L.A. Gear California Inc., 853 F.2d 1557,
1562 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
147. Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Prods. Co., 793 F.2d
1279, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
148. See Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chair, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1571
(Fed. Cir. 1986) ("The resulting erroneous but clear impression that patentees bear
a burden of 'proving validity' has frequently resulted in cluttered records, irrelevant
detours, undue burdens on the judicial process, and unnecessary work for the trial
court."). Validity and infringement are two separate questions for the trier of fact
and should be treated separately. See generally Witherspoon, supra note 113.
149. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677,
685 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
150. Parker, supra note 113, at 276-78.
151. As the prosecution history is contained in the file wrapper, the estoppel is
often referred to as file wrapper estoppel. For an example of a file wrapper, see
SEIDEL, supra note 28, Appendix A.
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the prosecution of the patent." 2 In general, once the patentee concedes
a certain claim or amends the claim to circumvent the limitation on
the patent grant posed by the prior art cited by the Examiner, the
patentee is estopped from asserting that an equivalent reading on the
original claim is valid under the doctrine of equivalents." 3 Using
equity to limit equity, 5, 4 the Federal Circuit's application of prosecution history estoppel has become ensnared and confused in the Federal
Circuit's attempts to limit the doctrine of equivalents.'
Although the Federal Circuit would like as broad an application
of this doctrine as possible, the Federal Circuit has been less than
clear as to whether the estoppel applies to all amendments and remarks
equally. In Hughes, the Federal Circuit took a liberal attitude towards
the level of estoppel, stating: "Amendments may be of different types
and may serve different functions. Depending on the nature and
purpose of an amendment, it may have a limiting effect within a
spectrum ranging from great to small to zero." 5 6 Furthermore, as the
court explained in a later case, "In cases where a patentee's amendments were not required in a response to an examiner's rejection or
critical to the allowance of the claims, no estoppel has been found....
Similarly, estoppel is not necessarily created by an amendment designed only to remove a § 112 indefiniteness rejection."' 5 7
Other Federal Circuit cases have not evidenced the same liberal
attitude towards the application of this limitation. On one occasion,
the Federal Circuit specifically declined to undertake "speculative
inquiries" into matters beyond the file wrapper in deciding for or
against estoppel.'5 8 However, the Federal Circuit later explained that
this hesitancy to go beyond the scope of the file wrapper is "performed
152. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

153. Id. ("The estoppel applies to claim amendments ...
submitted to obtain the patent . . ").

and to arguments

154. Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031, 1036 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) ("As early as 1880, the Supreme Court enunciated this estoppel rule to
limit the scope of the doctrine of equivalents ...

This rule, as well as careful

confinement of the doctrine of equivalents to its proper equitable role, promotes
certainty and clarity in determining the scope of patent rights.").
155. See Adelman, New World, supra note 19, at 998 ("This formalistic approach to prosecution history estoppel limits the use of equivalents, but does so in a
random, unfocused manner.").
156. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1363.
157. Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Prod., 793 F.2d 1279,
1285 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
158. Kitzenbaum v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985).
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as a legal matter on a case-by-case basis," thus limiting these holdings
to the facts of the particular cases' 5 9
V.

LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM:
THE REISSUE PROCESS16

While the debate in the Federal Circuit rages on, the proponents
of certainty would appear to be nibbling away at the scope of the
doctrine with each successive opinion, subject only to the additional
confusion caused by the somewhat contradictory opinions produced
by different panels of the Federal Circuit. Despite the confusion, the
actions of the Federal Circuit do exhibit a central truth, that the time
has come to eliminate the expansive role sought for the doctrine of
equivalents as presented in Graver Tank.
As the times change, so does the law. The patent claiming
structures which existed when the doctrine was first created no longer
exist. The old central claiming system, so intricately interwoven and
16
reliant on judicial interpretation for its very vitality, ' has given way
159. Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 871 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Smith, supra note 75, at 924-25 (reasoning the differences in decisions is not
see
But
so much the facts of the cases, but the pioneer-non-pioneer status of the patents
involved).
160. See generally 4 CHIsuM, supra note 13, ch.15; HARMON, supra note 9, §
13.3; 5 KAYTON, supra note 9, at 22-37 to 22-97.
161. Prior to 1836, the United States patent system was administered without
any form of examination by the government. WILLIAM ROBINSON, THE LAW OF
PATENTS 81 (1890). See generally 2 CHISUM, supra note 13, § 8.02, at 8-5; Molinaro,
supra note 75, at 791 n.34 (containing a brief historical summary of the patent Acts
from 1790 to the present). The original Patent Act only required the applicant to
submit a specification. Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 109-110 (1848). In the
specification, the applicant was required to describe and explain the invention in
sufficient detail as to distinguish the invention from things in existence and use prior
to the invention and to enable one skilled in the art to construct and use the invention.
Id. The patent, as a form of intellectual property, was substantially valueless as the
validity of the grant could only be ascertained through a "tedious, expensive, and
uncertain ...

private inquiry." Id.

The Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1856), brought about a dramatic
change in the patent system. A tribunal, the Patent and Trademark Office, was
created to examine all applications submitted to the Patent Office for "new and
useful discoveries, inventions, and improvements

...

"

Id. at 117-18. This change

increased the value of the patents as their validity was ascertainable through public
rather than private inquiry, ROBINSON, supra, at 82, but the changes did little to
increase the definiteness of the borders of the patent grant.
However, the Patent Act of 1836, unlike the Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No.
82-593, 66 Stat. 792, did not contain a requirement that the patent application
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to a new peripheral claiming system. Unlike central claiming, Congress
has sought through peripheral claiming to put the responsibility on
the inventor to protect the invention through well-prepared legal
representation outside of the judicial system and within the Patent
Office.
The idea of change for the doctrine of equivalents is not new.
The dissent in Winans strongly disagreed with the majority's liberal
view towards infringement by equivalence. The dissent, like the later
dissent in Graver Tank, felt that to interpret the language of the
patent to include equivalents would undermine the claiming system

contain, "one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." Id. § 112, at 798
(compared with "[H]e shall particularly specify and point out the part, improvement
or combination, which he claims as his own invention or discovery." Patent Act of
1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (1856).). Rather, claims were first viewed as guides
which could be used to help ascertain the patentee's invention, detailed in the
specification. 2 CHISUM, supra note 13, § 8.02[2), at 8-7; Steadman, supra note 113,
at 1-2. This claiming method, where the claims were written as guides to the
interpretation of the limiting specification rather than boundaries in and of themselves, was known as the central definition system.
The reliance on the specification in the claims was indicated through the use of
the phrase "as herein described." Examples of central definition system claims are:
What I claim as my invention, and desire to secure by letter patent, is the
application to steam boilers of a fusible alloy, which will melt at a given
temperature, and allow the steam to escape, as herein described; using for
that purpose any metallic compound which will produce the intended effect.
Steadman, supra note 113, at 2 n.l (copied from the Patent Office form book of
1839).
What I claim as my invention, and desire to secure by letters-patent, is
making the body of a car for the transportation of coal, &c., in the form
of a frustrum of a cone, substantially as herein described, whereby the force
exerted by the weight of the load presses equally in all directions, and does
not tend to change the form thereof, so that every part resists in equal
proportion, and by which, also, the lower part is so reduced as to pass
down within the truck frame and between the axles, to lower the centre [sic]
of gravity of the load without diminishing the capacity of the car as
described.
Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 342 (1853).
Society implicitly relied on the courts to liberally interpret the unknown boundary
of the grant. Not all members of the judiciary were satisfied with the liberal
interpretation of the Act of 1836. See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 347 (1853)
(Campbell, J., dissenting) ("[T]he invention shall particularly 'specify and point' out
what he claims as his invention. Fulness [sic], clearness, exactness, preciseness, and
particularity ... will alone fulfil [sic] the demands of Congress or the wants of the
country."); Molinaro, supra note 75, at 792 n.34.
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claiming system
and destroy the public's ability to rely on the patent
1 62
patentee.
the
to
granted
boundaries
the
to mark
In their vocal dissent in Graver Tank, Justices Black and Douglas
63
also found no need for the doctrine of equivalents whatsoever., The
doctrine was said to work the evil of treating the claims "like a nose
of wax which may be turned and twisted in any direction . . . so as
to make it something more than, or something different from, what
its words express . . . . "16 For the dissenters, the protection of the

boundary incentive of the patent system outweighed any damage the
165
disclosure incentive may sustain as a result of this "infringement.'
The dissent suggested patentees who suffer from "infringement"

beyond the literal scope of the claims of their patent should avail
themselves of the reissue process.166
Interestingly enough, the opinion in Wilson could also be viewed
as a call for change in the doctrine of equivalents analysis via a reissue
process, just like the dissent in Graver Tank. The problem exists that
the "reissue" process talked about in Wilson amounts to nothing

more than a judicial, rather than a statutory, reissue process.

Although the opinion never calls doctrine of equivalents with the

"hypothetical claim" analysis a reissue process, the similarities in
process and final effect between the doctrine with a "hypothetical
claim" analysis and the reissue process are striking. 167 Both procedures

can involve a broadening of protection over areas of subject matter
162. Will this be the limit to that claim? Who can tell the bounds within
which the mechanical industry of the country may freely exert itself? ...
• . . Fulness [sic], clearness, exactness, preciseness, and particularity, in
the description of the invention, its principle, and the matter claimed to be
invented, will alone fulfil [sic] the demands of Congress or the wants of the
country. Nothing, in the administration of this law, will be more mischievous, more productive of oppressive and costly litigation, of exorbitant and
unjust pretensions and vexatious demands, more injurious to labor, than a
relaxation of these wise and salutary requisitions of the act of Congress. In
my judgement, the principles of legal interpretation, as well as the public
interest, require, that this language of this statute shall have its full significance and import.
56 U.S. at 347 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
163. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 612-13
(1950) (Black, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 614 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51
(1886)).
165. Id. at 607.
166. Id. at 615 (Black, J., dissenting).
167. See Parker, supra note 113, at 286.
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not previously claimed but also not new to the patent. 6 Although
the Federal Circuit and numerous authors resist the description of the
doctrine of equivalents as an expansion of the claims, 69 the results
would be similar if the decision was available for use as persuasive
precedent by the patentee in later infringement cases brought under
the same patent. 170 Furthermore, both procedures would require the
use of "traditional patentability rules"' 7' in the examination of the
broadening of the patent.
Unfortunately, the similarities between the two devices stop here.
None of the statutorily mandated protections for the public are
contained in the "hypothetical claim" analysis/reissue process. The
judicial reissue process contains no mention of a two-year limitation7 2
on the use of the doctrine and the defendant infringer does not obtain
the protection of "intervening rights.' '1 73 But the complications created by the "hypothetical claim" consist of more than just safeguards
168. The idea of the "hypothetical claim" analysis is to draft a new claim which
will encompass the infringer's device as none of the claims in the patent can do so
as presently drafted. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904
F.2d 677, 684 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

169. E.g.,

HARMON,

supra note 9, § 1.3, at 12.

170. A finding of patent invalidity can be used by an alleged infringer as
collateral estoppel against a patentee involved in subsequent patent infringement
litigation. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313,
350 (1971); see BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 261-62 (6th ed. 1990) (stating collateral
estoppel "prevents relitigation by plaintiff of issues previously lost against another
defendant"). However, the Court specifically avoided addressing the question of
offensive use of prior judgments by the patentee against an alleged infringer. BlonderTongue, 402 U.S. at 329-30.
In answer to the question left open by Blonder-Tongue, the Federal Circuit has
found that offensive use of prior judgements is not allowable. Stevenson v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705, 710-11 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Offensive use is not allowable
because the courts do not find patents valid, but that the defendants have failed to
meet their burden of proof. Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1429 n.3 (Fed.
Cir. 1988). However, the prior judgement of validity may have some persuasive
effect. Stevenson, 713 F.2d at 711 ("As we have indicated, the decision serves only
as a 'red flag warning' to the district court to apply the full and fair criteria very
carefully . . ").
By analogy, a finding of "validity" as to a "hypothetical claim," while not
binding on future courts, could be viewed as persuasive, yielding a similar benefit to
the patentee as in the reissue process.
171. Compare the language of Wilson, "traditional patentability rules," with
the language of the statute, "provisions of this title relating to applications for
patent," 35 U.S.C. § 251, 3 (1988).
172. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
173. See infra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
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denied, for the complications have been shown to include new problems created in practice and at trial.
The Patent Act allows the patentee, with some limitations, to
74
change the patent through a process known as reissue. To qualify
for reissue, the patent must be "wholly or partly inoperative or
invalid,' 1 75 the defect must arise "through error without any deceptive
intent,'' 1 76 the reissue application cannot introduce "new matter,"
and the application must meet all the normal requirements of patent-

ability.

17

Two possible defects will satisfy the requirement of inoperativeness or invalidity. The first defect is a "defective specification or
drawing.' 1 78 The second defect is a defect in the claims. A sufficient
defect in the claims occurs when "the patentee [claims] more or less
1 79
Although either
than he had a right to claim in the patent.'
underclaiming or overclaiming is a sufficient defect, broadening reissues, where the patentee claims more in the reissue than was previously
80
claimed, are subject to statutory procedural limitations.
The error which occurred can be one of fact, or law, or judg8 2
ment,' but the error must be without deceptive intent. While the
83 brazen abuses of
courts generally read this requirement liberally,'
the Patent Office do not meet with approval. The doctrine of recapture
was created to deal with this specific abuse of the Patent Office:
applicants who surrender subject matter before the Patent Office
while prosecuting the patent in order to get the patent and then
attempt to "recapture" the same subject matter through the reissue
84
process.
174. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792.
175. 35 U.S.C. § 251,

1 (1988).

176. Id.
177. The provisions of this title relating to applications for patent shall be
applicable to applications for reissue of a patent, except that application for
reissue may be made and sworn to by the assignee of the entire interest if
the application does not seek to enlarge the scope of the claims of the
original patent.

35 U.S.C. § 251, 3 (1988).
178. 35 U.S.C. § 251, 1 (1988).
179. Id.
180. There is a two year limitation on broadening reissue patents. 35 U.S.C. §
4 (1988) ("No reissued patent shall be granted enlarging the scope of the
251,
claims of the original patent unless applied for within two years from the grant of
the original patent.").
181. See generally 4 CHisum, supra note 13, § 15.03[2][b], at 15-66 to 15-73.

182. 35 U.S.C. § 251, 1 (1988) ("[W]ithout any deceptive intention ... .
183. 4 CHIsUM, supra note 13, § 15.03121, at 15-63.
184. See generally 4 CHSUM, supra note 13, § 15.03[2][e], at 15-74 to 15-80.
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The applicant also cannot introduce new matter over the subject
matter disclosed in the specification in the old patent 85 or violate the
rules of patentability in the new application. 816 The Patent Office does
not stop rigorous enforcement of the patentability requirements during
the reissue process merely because the applicant has a previously
granted patent.
In addition to the requirements for reissue mentioned above,

there are two major limitations on the reissue process: the two-year
limitation on broadening patents'87 and the concept of "intervening

rights."' 88 The two-year limitation prevents patentees from filing for
broadening reissue patents after two years from the grant of the

patent. 8 9 The concept of "intervening rights" also can be invoked
for two different reasons to limit the reissued patent. A manufacturer
or user may use or sell a "specific thing" after reissue as long as the
action was not an infringement against the original patent, even if the
action infringes the reissued patent.' 90 In the second instance, the
court has the discretion to allow continued manufacturing, use, or
sale of a thing if the thing was made, used or purchased prior to

reissue or substantial preparation for manufacture, use, or sale was
conducted.' 9' In either instance, the court can equitably decide the
terms of the manufacture, use, and sale required to protect the actions
made prior to the reissue patent by the "infringer."' '

92

185. 35 U.S.C. § 251, 1 (1988) ("No new matter shall be introduced into the
application for reissue.").
186. 35 U.S.C. § 251, 3 (1988).
187. 35 U.S.C. § 251, 4 (1988).
188. No reissued patent shall abridge or affect the right of any person or
his successors in business who made, purchased or used prior to the grant
of a reissue anything patented by the reissued patent, to continue the use
of, or to sell to others to be used or sold, the specific thing so made,
purchased or used, unless the making, using or selling of such thing infringes
a valid claim of the reissued patent which was in the original patent. The
court before which such matter is in question may provide for the continued
manufacture, use or sale of the thing made, purchased or used as specified,
or for the manufacture, use or sale of which substantial preparation was
made before the grant of the reissue, and it may also provide for the
continued practice of any process patented by the reissue, practice, or for
the practice of which substantial preparation was made, prior to the grant
of the reissue, to the extent and under such terms as the court deems
equitable for the protection of investments made or business commenced
before the grant of the reissue.
35 U.S.C. § 252, 2 (1988).
189. 35 U.S.C. § 251, 4 (1988).
190. 35 U.S.C. § 252, 2 (1988).
191. Id.
192. Id.
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Unfortunately, the reissue process appears to be only a limited

possible solution to the doctrine of equivalents. The major problem
with use of the reissue process as a substitute for judicial intervention
via the doctrine of equivalents is the fragile state of the Patent Office.
While the number and complexity of patents has steadily increased
over the years, 93 the Patent Office has remained fundamentally
unchanged. Had the technology of procedures in the Patent Office
increased at the same rate as technology increased in general, the
discrepancy in numbers might not have been so crippling. However,
the examination procedure and the prior art search conducted for
these patent applications has remained fundamentally the same since

the nineteenth century.194
Another particularly distressing statistic to note is the high turnover rate among skilled Patent Examiners. In some of the most
193. Over one hundred and twenty years passed between the first patent issued
and the one millionth patent issued, but the last one million patents have issued in
less than a quarter of that time. William G. Conger, Patent Reexamination Reexamined, 1986 DET. C. L. REv. 523, 531. In fact, over 174,000 patent applications
were received by the Patent Office in 1990, allowing for only eighty hours to be
spent per patent during examination. David C. Churbuck & Gary Slutsker, Whose
Invention Is It Anyway?, FORBES, Aug. 19, 1991, at 114, 116; see also David L.
Wilson, New Inventions in the United States, NAT. J., Mar. 2, 1991, at 533, 533
(number of patent applications growing at a annual rate of 7.5 percent from fiscal
1984-89).
194. Unlike the European and Japanese Patent Offices, which use computerized
systems to track applications and patents, the Patent Office relies predominantly on
a system of manual searches during the examination of a patent, a procedure
fundamentally unchanged since the office first started examining patents over two
centuries ago. Michele Galen, et al., Is It Time to Reinvent the Patent System?, Bus.
WK., Dec. 2, 1991, at 110, 113. The few computers that do exist in the Patent Office
exist because of the personal initiative of the individual Patent Examiners. Churbuck
& Slutsker, supra note 193, at 116. This lack of computer capability has had a
negative effect on the pendency of a patent application. Currently, the average
duration of a patent examination is in the neighborhood of eighteen months.
Churbuck & Slutsker, supra note 193, at 115; see also SEIDEL, supra note 28, § 5.03,
at 66 (one to three years). In some new technologies, such as biotechnology, the
duration is much closer to two years. Wilson, supra note 193, at 533 (26.3 months
per biotechnology patent application).
The system of manual searches has other drawbacks, beside the obvious time
inefficiencies created. The procedure is only as good as the database from which the
information is drawn from, a database quickly falling behind the state of the art in
many of the important new technologies, such as computer science and biotechnology.
See Conger, supra note 193, at 531; Churbuck & Slutsker, supra note 193, at 116.
In addition, unlike in a computerized database, the examiner must deal with items
which have been either lost or stolen over the years. Churbuck & Slutsker, supra
note 193, at 116 (stating over 2 million of the 27 million U.S. and foreign patents
on file are "missing - in use, lost, or stolen").
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important high-technology areas, the turnover rate is in excess of 50
percent. 95 Low pay and high stress are two of the primary causes of
the enormous demand for new Examiners each year.'1
To think that the reissue process will provide a simple and
absolute answer to the problems with the doctrine of equivalents
oversimplifies the problems, of requiring the Patent Office to assume
primary jurisdiction over the area. A further burden on this tenuously
balanced system could result in more uncertainty in the field of patent
law as a result of poorly handled prosecutions and reissues than any
number of conflicting Federal Circuit decisions. However, to totally
ignore the possibility of the reissue process as one element in a
program of revitalization for the patent system would be taking the
limitations of the Patent Office too far in the opposite direction.
VI.

A

MORE RESPECTFUL ROLE FOR THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

The doctrine of equivalents made perfect sense in the context of
a central definition claiming system which had very poorly defined
boundaries.' 97 It made sense to talk in terms of, "not only the precise
forms [the patentee] has described, but all other forms which embody
his invention."' 9 The judiciary was considered an essential partner in
the continued viability of such a claiming scheme by most.199
With the new claiming system, requiring peripheral claiming, 2°°
the courts do not need to bring such a high level of additional meaning
to the words of the patent claims. The job of correctly ascertaining
the proper boundaries of the grant has been left by Congress, as is
their constitutional right, 20' fundamentally to the Patent Office and
the representatives of the inventor. 2 2 Before the Graver Tank decision,
some in the legal community had suggested that this change in the
195. Churbuck & Slutsker, supra note 193, at 115 (noting that this high turnover
rate, when combined with the long pendency of some applications, may result in a
greater number of applications being allowed as examiners leave the Patent Office).
196. The starting pay for a Patent Examiner is anywhere from $22,000 to
$30,000. Churbuck & Slutsker, supra note 193, at 116. The pressure to produce is
great 'for those wishing to advance as promotion and merit pay are both directly
related to the efficiency of the examiner's examination methods. Conger, supra note
193, at 530 n.32.
197. See supra note 161.
198. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 342 (1853).

199. See supra note 161.
200. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
201. U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8, cl. 8.

202. See Adelman, Doctrine, supra note 9, at 676.
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manner of claiming would be the eventual death knell of the doctrine
of equivalents. 203

Unfortunately, the Patent Office is unable, for a number of
reasons, to assume sole responsibility for ascertaining the boundaries

of the patent grant. Perhaps the best solution, therefore, is a partnership between the judiciary and the Patent Office, combined with an

increased emphasis on placing more of the responsibility on the
patentee for protection of the invention.
For to accompany the stagnation of the United States economy,
a stagnation of inventive genius is also being played out across the
United States. Foreign companies consistently obtain more American
patents than their domestic counterparts. 2°4 Rather than spending
money on research, some companies have resorted to increased litiof patents to provide a steady
gation over a steadily aging portfolio
205

income for investors and officers.
To curb this kind of activity and renew interest in systematic and
scientific growth, the Federal Circuit's restriction of the doctrine of
equivalents certainly is a step in right direction with respect to the
limitation on patent litigation which it represents. However, the
confused state of the law still provides too much uncertainty to rely
on it solely to discourage the corporate world intent on using patent
litigation as a source of quick wealth in place of substantial investment
in research and development.
203. See Timothy L. Tilton, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Cases, 32 J.
OFF. Soc'y 861 (1950).
204. See PTO, Statistics, 40 PAT. TRADEMARK COPYRIGHT J. 167 (1985) (stating
only four of top ten companies holding U.S. patents are U.S. companies: General
Electric Co., U.S. Phillips Corp., IBM Corp., and Eastman Kodak Co.).
205. One of the best-known offenders is Texas Instruments. Texas Instruments
has generated over $911 million in royalties from 1986 to 1991. Galen, supra note
194, at 112. In fact, in 1989 and 1990, Texas Instruments generated more profit from
the enforcement of its patent rights than from its basic business operations. Id.
Texas Instruments has been able to achieve these results through tenacious and
aggressive litigation policies. See Andrew Pollack, The New High-Tech Battleground,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 3, 1988, § 3, at 1. Some in the industry have criticized Texas
Instruments' methods. See, e.g., Galen, supra note 194, at 113 ('TI [Texas Instruments] would be better off spending its energies fixing their product line,' says
PAT.

Wilfred J.Corrigan, CEO of LSI Logic Corp .... one of five semiconductor makers

sued by TI for infringement."). Texas Instruments, however, remains unmoved.
"'We have had an asset that we have been underutilizing' . . . ." Pollack, supra, §
3, at 1 (from conversation with Richard J. Agnich, general counsel, Texas Instruments).
These actions have not gone unnoticed in the legal community. Ronald Laurie,
a California attorney with a practice focused on computer law, stated, "If you have
good patents, litigation is a better way of making money than selling products." Id.
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The doctrine of equivalents should be restricted to two special
situations so that some incentive is created to be at the edge of
advancing technologies once again. To begin with, the doctrine of
equivalents should be applied to combat the open piracy of inventions.20 6 The Graver Tank majority was correct in decrying the unscrupulous copyist who in essence steals the invention from the
patentee through minor modifications calculated to circumvent the
literal language of the patent.
The doctrine of equivalents should also be applied in those cases,
like Hughes, where the technology of the application advances beyond
what could be reasonably foreseen at the time of the application. 207
In this situation, it would be unfair not to protect a novel invention
where the only fault is an inability of the drafter and inventor to see
into and predict the future. 208
For the majority of inventions, however, the patent will be
afforded no more than what is literally allowable according to the
scope of the patent. This application would encourage companies to
get to the forefront of the technology once again as only at the edge
will the drafter have the opportunity to obtain wide boundaries for
the inventor's discovery. It is true that this would put the inventor at
the mercy of the draftsman, but perhaps it is once again time
emphasize prospective thinking into the patent system.
To some extent, the Federal Circuit has already shown their
willingness to move in this direction in London v. Carson Pirie Scott
& C0.2 9 London involved infringement litigation over the design of
clamps used in travel garment bags. 21 0 The London patents claimed
two different designs of clamp, one for a horizontal clamp and the
other for a vertical clamp. 21 ' Both of the clamps consisted of two Cshaped metal channels, lined with a resilient material, pinned at one
end with a hinge pin, and connected at the other end by a latching
device. 21 2 The horizontal clamp attached to the shank portion of the
206. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607
(1950).
207. Adelman, New World, supra note 19, at 997 ("One possible approach
would be to limit the use of the doctrine to situations where the accused product or

process uses technology that was not in existence at the time of the patent grant
. . . .11)

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Adelman, Doctrine, supra note 9, at 726-27.
946 F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1535-36.
Id.
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hanger below the hook, which extended outside of the garment bag. 213
The vertical clamp attached directly to the hook portion of the
21 4
hanger.
The garment bag, distributed by Carson Pirie Scott, Marshall
Field, and other stores, also consisted of a metal C-shaped channel
lined with a resilient material and joined at one end to an upper
channel with a hinge pin. 215 However, the design differed in that the
bottom channel was riveted to the internal structure of the garment
bag. 21 6 The two channels were closed by pushing the channels together
with the use of a camming device.2"7
The court wasted little time getting to the heart of the matter.
The court recognized that the patent system is a balance between two
competing concerns: certainty for the public and protection for the
patentee. 2'8 The court also recognized that the doctrine of equivalents
was originally designed to prevent insubstantial changes made to pirate
the invention claimed in the original patent. 219 Recognizing this fact,
the court still concluded:
Application of the doctrine of equivalents is the exception,
however, not the rule, for if the public comes to believe (or
fear) that the language of the patent claims can never be relied
on, and that the doctrine of equivalents is simply the second
prong of every infringement charge, regularly available to
extend protection beyond the scope of the claims, then claims
will cease to serve their intended purpose. Competitors will
220
never know whether their action infringe a granted patent.
VII.

CoNcLusIoN

The doctrine of equivalents was created during a time when
Congress gave the judiciary an active role in defining the bounds of
the patent grant. With the advent of legislation providing a more
certain grant of protection to the patentee, the recession of the
judiciary as a powerful influence over the scope of the patent has
appeared imminent, but has remained elusive.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 1536.
Id.
Id.at 1537.
Id.
Id.

218. Id. at 1538.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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With the creation of the Federal Circuit, a powerful new metamorphosis has occurred within the doctrine itself which promised to
reduce the influence of the judiciary through the strict regimentation
of what was formerly an open equitable doctrine. However, the change
in the doctrine has not provided what it promised. The original rulings
of the Federal Circuit and the indecision which followed have proceeded to limit the doctrine in only the most sporadic of fashions.
Now is the time for the Federal Circuit to renew the usefulness
of the doctrine of equivalents by decreasing the scope of its application. By limiting the application of the doctrine only to those cases
where a showing of "piracy" is made or the defect in claiming was
caused by an advance in technology, the doctrine can remain as a
viable tool for the patentee while eliminating the need for piecemeal
restriction of the doctrine. This restriction may also have the added
effect of inducing research into new areas of technology by eliminating
the advantage of sitting on one's .laurels and obtaining the advantages
of invention through litigation rather than through the marketplace.
PAUL C. CRAANE

